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ABSTRACT
Indonesia’s foreign policy during under Soeharto period (1966-1998) was closely related to the con-
figuration of domestic politics, in which Soeharto comfortably enjoyed unchallenged authoritative
power.  After consolidating his power during the first and second decade in power, Soeharto sought a
greater and more prestigious international leadership role since the late 1980s.  The foreign policy’s
higher profile was possible since Soeharto felt confident as he held a tighter decisive control over
domestic politics and had successfully brought restoration to Indonesia’s debilitated economy.  Details
on how this process took place during the last years of Soeharto’s presidency were the central theme of
this article.
APEC and NAM were the two latest cases in showing Soeharto’s ability to utilize his dominant posi-
tion at home for his ambition in pursuing a more distinguished international figure in 1990s.  In NAM,
Soeharto projected his global statesmanship by playing a concessive role as a leader of developing coun-
tries.  Soeharto’s ambition in NAM was to revitalized platform of NAM toward greater economic and
developmental cooperation among developing countries.  In the case of APEC, Soeharto seemed to
employ conciliatory attitude toward developed countries, particularly US and Japan.
Based on this assumption, it was believed that Soeharto significantly influenced a sudden changing
position of Indonesian policy toward APEC liberalization plan from strongly rejected in 1993 into the
leading supporter in 1994 by sponsoring the Bogor Declaration.  The Bogor Declaration itself was
regarded as one of the most progressive liberalization plans in the world.
The dilemma was that in 1994 Soeharto assumed these two leaderships simultaneously.  It is interest-
ing to view how excellent Soeharto managed this seemingly contradictory attitude in foreign policy-
making.  A closer look on the details of Soeharto’s international ambition in both cases; the pictures on
national actors surrounding him; and the idiosyncratic factors proves initial evidence that different
sources of policy advisers in national level did not necessarily produce contradictory foreign posture.
Instead, the nature of contradictory had been Soeharto’s inexperience and his personal ambition to be
an internationally distinguished profile.  For this purpose, he utilized different background of advisors
whom were able to support his goal.  In NAM policy he preferred to employ present diplomatic bureau-
cratic procedure while in APEC he felt needful to cut off inefficient bureaucratic line and developed a
short cut policy-making process instead.  A crucial finding is that the consistency and rationality in
terms of foreign policies’ substances were not Soeharto’s main concern.
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Introduction: 
Soeharto’s Role in Indonesia’s APEC and NAM Policies
At the Second Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Bogor on November 15, 1994,
Indonesia surprised the world by radically shifting its position on APEC namely sponsoring the Bogor
Declaration1, which proposed the fixed timetable of economic liberalization.  Indonesia had transformed
itself from a country that at the Seattle APEC Ministerial Meeting in 1993 still exhibited a strong rejec-
tion on the idea of liberalization to a strong proponent of a liberalization policy in the following year.
The Bogor Declaration itself is widely considered as a political decision for furthering APEC liberal-
ization plan in a more technical term.  One of the most significant provisions on the declaration is the
specific time frame for full implementation of APEC free trade goals: by 2010 for the developed coun-
tries and by 2020 for the developing members.  In an abstract, the Bogor Declaration constitutes the fol-
lowing principles:
1).  A commitment to liberalization towards free and open trade in the region;
2).  A target date for achieving free and open trade in the region;
3).  A requirement of consistency with GATT/WTO rules and principles.
Ross Garnaut (1996) identifies the detailed terms as the “Indonesian formula”2 because he believed
that the host, Indonesian Delegation, formulated the text.  The content of Bogor Declaration could be
viewed in comparison with the liberalization provisions under the GATT/WTO.  There are explicit quo-
tations of the GATT/WTO rules in the Bogor Declaration, meaning that the terms of global liberaliza-
tion would be observed.  The central pillars of the GATT, Article 1, “the-most-favored-nation” and
Article 24 “the non-discrimination” principle, are assumed to be complied.
Further, Garnaut argues that the “Indonesian formula” would not justify discrimination under Article
24 GATT/WTO, nor launch a negotiation amongst APEC members to develop a binding schedule of
reductions in protection to produce free trade that might one day qualify under Article 24.3 Above all,
he regarded the APEC Bogor Declaration as a stronger commitment to the objective of free trade than
have ever been made by other international communities such as GATT/WTO or G-7.4
It was not very clear who in Indonesia drafted the text of Bogor Declaration.  As far as the substance
was concerned, the text resembles the liberalization proposal of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) of
APEC.  In 1993, at the Seattle Meeting, Indonesian Delegation to APEC ministerial meeting, co-chaired
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Trade, firmly rejected the idea contained in the
EPG proposal on the grounds that it would take place at the cost of the interest of APEC’s developing
members including Indonesia.5
President Soeharto was the only one in Indonesia who was able to clinch firm position in the change
of APEC policy.  Soeharto’s will to nurture APEC liberalization plan was backed by a group of econom-
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ic technocrats that was informally led by Dr.  Widjojo Nitisastro.  Dr.  Widjojo Nitisastro was largely
dubbed as the architect of Soeharto’s New Order grand economic policies.  Over the first ten year of
Soeharto’s presidency, Dr.  Widjojo served as a minister who chaired the National Development
Planning Agency (Bappenas).  He subsequently assumed higher ministerial post: the Coordinating
Minister for Economic and Finance, but he had still been concurrently the chairman of Bappenas until
1983.
Afterward, although not holding formal portfolio cabinet post, Dr.  Widjojo still took up the position
of the President’s Economic Adviser and continued to be so in the post-Soeharto’s era at President
Habibie’s administration (1998-1999).  Either inside (1966-1983) or outside (1983-1999) formal portfo-
lio cabinet posts, Dr.  Widjojo was always a dominant figure in shaping Indonesian economic policies
including the pursuant of economic reforms.  His closeness to Soeharto also made him capable to place
his junior colleagues from the Economic Faculty of the University of Indonesia to fulfill ministerial
posts of economic portfolios at the consecutives Soeharto’s cabinets.6 Dr.  Widjojo’s title as the
President’s Economic Adviser was treated as equal to a senior ministerial position.7
Under Dr.  Widjojo strong influence, the economic technocrats –almost all of them were professors at
the Faculty of Economic of the University of Indonesia– had from the beginning been very influential to
the President’s decision in macro-economic policies, but only recently they involved in foreign policies
like APEC, NAM and ASEAN.8
The involvement of the technocrat group in APEC can be observed from the appointment of Professor
Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo as Soeharto’s special assistant for APEC affairs.  Though not an economist,
Professor Bintoro was very close to the economic technocrats.  Mr.  Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo is a profes-
sor of public administration at the University of Indonesia.  In mid 1980s he served as the Head of
Public Administration Institute (LAN=Lembaga Administrasi Negara) and from 1990 to 1993, he was
the Indonesian Ambassador to the Netherlands.9 The appointment of Professor Bintoro was interesting
because for a similar role for NAM envoy, Soeharto appointed Mr.  Nana Sutresna10, a career diplomat
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).
Indonesia and Soeharto’s achievement in sponsoring the Bogor Declaration in 1994 was hailed by
international media as a triumph of Soeharto’s personal diplomacy.  It was vividly reported that the
accomplishment in convening the APEC Summit and the promulgation of the Bogor Declaration had
brought good international images to Indonesia, and more importantly to Soeharto himself.  At the end
of the summit, it was described that US President Clinton credited Soeharto as a great Asian leader who
“is trying to spearhead and tear down trade barriers”.11
However, when Soeharto chaired the Bogor Meeting of APEC and sponsored the Bogor Declaration,
he was also the chairman of NAM, which had by that time long become a body of developing countries
claiming their right to development.  Economic and trade liberalization, which is the essence of the
Bogor Declaration, is more of developed countries’ interest than of developing countries’.  And in the
past, Indonesia, which is also a developing country, had been always sensitive to the interests of fellow
developing countries, including those from other regions.
Indonesia’s leadership on the NAM was on its apex when the country hosted the Tenth NAM Summit
in Jakarta in September 1992.  It was obvious from the decisions at the 1992 Summit in Jakarta that as
the chairman of NAM, Indonesia was obligated to preserve the interests of developing countries towards
the challenge and pressure of developed countries in a more globalized world.  At the Tenth NAM
Summit in Jakarta, the NAM had taken one of the most significant decisions: the Movement decided to
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restore the issue of economic cooperation to the top of the NAM’s agenda12.  At this Summit, the NAM,
under Indonesia’s chairmanship, proceeded to craft the concepts and modalities that would be the basis
and the framework of its concrete programs in economic programs, including the South-South coopera-
tion, North-South dialogue and issues covering the relations with North, such as developing countries’
debt problems.13
President Soeharto headed Indonesian Delegation to the NAM Summit in Jakarta and presided over
the plenary meetings.  And it was Soeharto –inspired by the success of Indonesian economic develop-
ment– who turned the direction of the NAM from political rhetoric of  “North versus South” confronta-
tion into a pragmatic economic heavy agenda.  This new direction of NAM was covered in a declaration
called “The Jakarta Message”.14
The dilemma for President Soeharto in playing a balanced role as the chairman of both NAM and
APEC during the same period created a debate concerning North-South policy (relations toward devel-
oped countries) vis-a-vis South-South policy (relations toward developing countries).  NAM and APEC,
the two forums that Soeharto chaired in 1994, represented a contrasting or even conflicting character of
his international leadership.  Thus, it is worth investigating how Soeharto escaped from feeling any con-
tradiction to be also chairman of NAM when in the capacity of chairman of the APEC Meeting he spon-
sored a “pro-North” liberalization proposal.
The answer can be found in various ways.  It is possible to argue that NAM was so much weakened
that even the state in chair dared to betray its collective interest.  Though not denying this possibility,
this article attempts to search for the answer in the foreign policy-making process, which was not
marked by adequate experiences when Soeharto concurrently became a chairman of NAM and APEC.
Soeharto and Indonesia under his presidency had been, in contrast with his predecessor, Sukarno15, in
low profile in foreign policy till as late as the 1980’s.  The reasons of low profile foreign policy will be
easily found, as the new leadership under Soeharto had been busily preoccupied with the task of consoli-
dating domestic power base.  It is thus not until the mid-1980’s when Indonesia could pay more atten-
tion to its foreign policy and project itself to the international community.  Moreover, foreign policy
making from the 1980’s did not escape from overall Indonesian political structure, that is, authoritarian
with Soeharto at its top.  It is least possible to expect him to have any diplomatic skill.  He had to
depend on his officials in decision-making process, but authoritarian regimes do not permit any horizon-
tal linkage between different sections of bureaucracy.16 Here could also sources of contradictory foreign
policies be found.
The aim of this article is to trace the sources of contradictory attitudes in Indonesian foreign policy in
1994, which were found in its postures toward NAM and APEC respectively.  Indonesian foreign policy
under Soeharto has not been well studied so far, due to the reason that Indonesia only recently showed
higher profile in its external relations.  This article is hence to contribute to develop this field of study by
adding some insights for understanding Soeharto’s Indonesia and its foreign policy making.
The Development of Foreign Policy-Making under Soeharto
Although it is a very recent feature that Indonesian foreign policy under Soeharto became a topic of
academic research and, thus, very few works have appeared so far.  One among the very rare studies
explaining the role of Soeharto within the area of Indonesian foreign policy-making in 1990s is the work
of Leo Suryadinata (1996).  It could be said that this book is the only study attempting adequate elucida-
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tion on the leadership aspects of the Indonesian foreign policy making in recent time.  President
Soeharto’s political functions were placed at the center of analysis, under the assumption that he was the
axial figure in Indonesian politics and public policies.17
It has been widely acknowledged that since around mid-1980s, the dominant power of President
Soeharto in shaping public policy-making process had extended into the area of foreign policy.18 One of
Suryadinata’s most significant premises is that this situation occurred due to the shifting influence of
other actors in foreign policy-making.  Soeharto’s growing interests in foreign policy was closely related
to the decreased importance of other prominent actors, or of the military among others.  In other words,
there was a tendency of shifting balance of power in Indonesian foreign policy makers, especially from
the military to the President as well as other possible new actors.19
Dr.  Suryadinata utilizes a tandem framework of historic-cultural and institution methods simultane-
ously as the main tool of analysis.  The platforms of this approach are focused on several internal and
external determinants: “Indonesian role in world affairs”, “capabilities”, “perception of external threat
and archipelago concept”, and -ultimately- “political culture and the foreign policy elite”.  The integrat-
ed analysis of these historical and institution approaches had been used in viewing the first three nation-
al determinants.  As for the last determinant –the political culture of the elite– Dr Suryadinata exploits
the combined application of the decision-making approach and political cultural perspectives.
The work of Suryadinata adopted historical method of analysis, or “British-style of analysis” as he
calls it.  He does not apply a more sophisticated American foreign-policy style due to specific intentions.
In an interview with me20, Dr.  Suryadinata explained some reasons why he opted for this approach: a)
Working variables in the Indonesian politics are very limited, including foreign policy studies.  It would
therefore be rather delicate to analyze from the American style of foreign policy analysis that requires a
more complicated pattern of decision-making environment; b) Given the distinction of Indonesian polit-
ical culture, the description on Indonesian national elite would not be adequate if it was merely relied on
Western theoretical frameworks; c) Dr Suryadinata is not a foreign policy expert.  Rather, he is a scien-
tist of Indonesian domestic politics.
Deviating from these points, Suryadinata wishes to observe some crucial distinct characters concern-
ing “the era of before and after” Soeharto’s higher profile in foreign policy making.  He spends as many
as two chapters –chapter 3 and 4– of his book to explain a number of basic comparisons between mili-
tary’s dominant role before the mid 1980s and Soeharto’s more assertive roles after the mid 1980s.
Thereafter he provides case studies of actual issues or topics in which Soeharto’s higher confident roles
exerted significant influence in the direction of Indonesian foreign policy.  These thematic issues are
Indonesian new position on ASEAN, Australia21, China, Vietnam, the world superpower —particularly
the US and Japan—, the Middle East and Bosnia; and NAM and APEC.  It is interesting that the cases
of Indonesian bilateral relations with respective country and international organization were employed
to describe the changing interests of Soeharto.
One of the most crucial premises is the time framing of events.  President Soeharto was considered as
the central figure in foreign policy making since mid 1980s, or between 1982 and 198322 to be exact.
The “new appetite”23 of Soeharto’s interest in foreign policy occurred after he was long-time preoccu-
pied and satisfied with maintaining domestic power.  A higher profile foreign policy was therefore con-
sidered as Soeharto’s new playing arena after he had secured domestic politics.  During the earlier peri-
od, until early 1980s, Soeharto delegated almost all-foreign policy-making to the military and a little
share to the MoFA.  Soeharto carried out very little attention and as a consequence, Indonesian foreign
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policy was in low profile.24
Dr.  Suryadinata then proceeds to argue that Soeharto was considered as the prime-determining ele-
ment in altering policy making at the national level.  The decisiveness of Soeharto’s personal ambition
for international fame in the change of foreign policy profile of Indonesia is an important insight in ana-
lyzing its diplomacy during the last decade.  However, there is no further elaboration in Suryadinata’s
study whether this situation was created by a simply personal growing interest, or there were also contri-
butions from various groups or bureaucracy and other actors around Soeharto.
Instead, he proposes an assumptive model of military –Soeharto– MoFA25 swinging pendulum that is
–according to Suryadinata– presumed as the most important platform of the Indonesia foreign policy-
making process.26 The MoFA was generally considered representing a nationalist view but its role in the
diplomatic and foreign policy-making in practice was very limited until the late 1980s.  The MoFA was
trapped in marginal role within the foreign policy making process in the first fifteen years of Soeharto’s
presidency.27 Thus, the MoFA was regarded as the third player attached to Soeharto’s more assertive
role in foreign policy28
The military, on the other hand, had for a decade of Soeharto’s administration overshadowed the func-
tions of MoFA in executing foreign-policy making.29 This was believed to be in accordance with gener-
al trend in which the military’s influence over every function in public policy, governance or bureaucra-
cy was slightly decreasing.30 The presumed superiority of the military over the bureaucrat (MoFA) was
eminent in the actual cases.  Excellent examples are, among others, the question of East Timor; the
problem of external threat31 and –to some extent– Indonesian position toward ASEAN.32 Equally impor-
tant were Indonesia’s relations with other neighbors, especially Australia, and some major global pow-
ers such as the US, Japan and the European countries.
In fact, there were more and more new players, actors, groups, appeared on the area of foreign policy-
making when President Soeharto’s affection on this field was increasing.  Provide the fact that Soeharto
was central figure in the overall Indonesian politics, the augmentation of Soeharto’s attention in foreign
policy would have created a number of possible spoilers who wanted to take advantage of this new situ-
ation.33
One reason why Dr.  Suryadinata fails to take these actors into horizon is that his concept merely con-
cerns those issues in political and security matters.  Actors in different field of foreign policy, for
instance in economic issues, might be quite different.34 The actors or groups –around Soeharto– who
advised the policies on developed countries, might be distinctly separatable from those who suggested
the policies toward developing countries.  Suryadinata’s basic argument is also not very clear in repre-
senting the policies on recent themes such as international trade and investment liberalization or the
problem of foreign debts.  The determinant factor of President Soeharto alone –no mater how huge his
dominant rule in domestic politics– would not be sufficient to postulate satisfactorily the changing for-
eign policies on some recent and complicated issues, including APEC.
Departing from Dr.  Suryadinata’s points of reference, my further elucidation on Soeharto’s contradic-
tory attitudes in APEC policy, in comparison with NAM, will be conducted in the following fashions:
1.  Observing Soeharto’s role in foreign policy making and diplomacy on APEC and NAM in the con-
text of pursuing higher recognition for his international leadership.
2.  Identifying what kind of groups or roots of influence on which Soeharto relied for his foreign policy
choices in mid 1990s, particularly on the APEC and NAM policies.
3.  Analyzing the idiosyncratic sources of Soeharto’s contradicting attitude in foreign policy making
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process in mid 1990s, particularly for the cases of APEC and NAM.
The Pursuant of Soeharto’s International Leadership
For Soeharto, who, after establishing unparalleled status in domestic politics, had an ambition to be a
glorious figure of international reputation, each of NAM and APEC gave good opportunities for this
purpose.  Although loosing such a great momentum as in the 1970’s, NAM was still a largest forum of
developing countries.  Indonesia, which had hosted the first and only Asian-African Conference four
decades ago, was qualified enough to lead the depressed group of post-Cold War non-alignment.
APEC, on its part, represented rapidly growing Asian economies.  Though Indonesia’s economic devel-
opment lagged behind some of other Southeast Asian neighbors, Soeharto was regarded as an informal
political leader of the regional grouping, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as a
leader of the biggest member-state.
Thus, in the context of Soeharto’s international leadership in 1990s –besides APEC and NAM–
ASEAN35 was an important place in which Indonesia as well as Soeharto expected to play a leading role.
This created a triangular pattern for Soeharto’s international leadership.  NAM represents the leadership
at a global level, APEC at the regional cooperation and ASEAN at a sub-regional form.  This triangular
connection of Soeharto’s leadership in the NAM, ASEAN and APEC is a tentative thesis for the role
Soeharto should play in APEC in 1994.36 Soeharto was regarded being able to apply its leadership skills
in ASEAN and the NAM, and then adopted the lesson to APEC.  The ability in creating a consensus
within ASEAN and the NAM should have been instrumental in giving direction to APEC.37
Indonesia’s –and personally Soeharto’s himself– initial position (1989 to 1993) towards APEC was
characterized by some reservations.  At the state level, there was deep concern that APEC might come
into conflict with ASEAN, which was then the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy.  Indonesia
feared that APEC would eclipse ASEAN –and by implication– Indonesia’s prominent role as the largest
member in the association.38 It was a mild surprise, therefore, that Indonesia conveyed a solid support
for the 1993 –the first ever– APEC leaders’ meeting in Seattle chaired by US President Clinton.39 In
Seattle, Soeharto agreed to host the second APEC Summit in 1994.
One of the foremost apparent personal ambitions of Soeharto was to upgrade his middle-ranked power
into the global level.  Some comments said that Soeharto had shown a good enough personality to pro-
ject his international leadership and to engage into a more collegial style of relationship, which was
characteristic in the post-Cold War era.40 There were personal relations among APEC leaders including
a special relationship between the US President Clinton and Soeharto.  Among APEC leaders there
appeared strong personal dynamics, as they shared the activist’s passion for change and optimism.  This
was the very time when Soeharto established a personal rapport with Clinton.41
Specifically on Soeharto-Clinton relations, it was said that Soeharto felt indebted to Clinton for meet-
ing with him on the eve of G-7 summit in Tokyo in July 1993.  In his capacity as chairman of NAM,
Soeharto wanted to set an extra reputation by meeting with developed countries’ leaders.  President
Clinton ultimately accepted this proposed meeting with Soeharto on a bilateral basis.42 Having warm
and collegial connections with major world leaders, President Soeharto became more confident in per-
forming diplomatic maneuverings in order to sustain his international leadership in APEC.43
Regarding the meeting with Clinton in 1993, there was an argument stating that Soeharto seemed dis-
appointed on Clinton’s response towards the proposal to re-open North-South dialogue under the aus-
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pices of NAM cooperation.  From various primary sources or resource-persons, and most importantly an
impression by interviewing him, it seems that Soeharto could be convinced that his leadership in APEC
in the following year (1994) would have been able to serve the desire of his, and also Indonesia’s, as
chairman of the NAM to implement North-South dialogue.  In this particular regard, it looks that
Soeharto was confident that he could utilize APEC as a vehicle in realizing his interest as chairman of
the NAM, especially concerning the employment of North-South dialogue.44
If Clinton was regarded as his closest ally, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad was consid-
ered as one of the greatest challengers for Soeharto in APEC diplomacy.  The rivalry seemed to arise
from a clash of personal reasons rather than rational consideration of national interests.45 Soeharto had
appeared since early 1994 as a leading proponent of APEC, whereas Mahathir had focused his energies
on the fruition of the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) that was considered as a “competitor” to
APEC.
The preceding one-year period leading to the Bogor Meeting, challenges to President Soeharto in pre-
siding over the success of APEC meeting were enormous.  First of all, Soeharto as the host wanted to
ensure that all leaders would attend the summit46.  Prime Minister Mahathir, who was absent in Seattle
meeting in 1993, agreed to participate.  However, Mahathir was still in opposition to the free trade
timetable for APEC but later changed his view, although with reservations about the 2020 deadline.47 In
attempt to get breakthrough toward substantive deadlock, Soeharto offered to the meeting what he
proudly dubbed as the “APEC flexible consensus”.48
It appears that Soeharto was not fully aware that it would be a political dilemma for him to push
Indonesia to enter into preferential arrangements with industrial countries of the “North” (developed
countries).49 According to Soeharto, an ideal policy for Indonesia toward APEC and NAM simultane-
ously would be to promote greater South-South cooperation on one hand and enter into open regional
trade arrangements with countries of the “North” on the other.50 Based on Soeharto’s personal percep-
tion, there should have been no conflict of interests between promoting “South-South cooperation” on
one hand and pursuing “open trade arrangement with North” on the other.51 As I hear directly from him,
this was exactly what Soeharto attempted to handle during his concurrent leadership in NAM and APEC
in 1994.  As common analysis reveals otherwise, this view could imply Soeharto’s ignorance over the
substance and all the consequences of his policy choices.
In my opinion, APEC leadership proves that Soeharto had shown pragmatism and flexibility —but
perhaps inconsistency— in shaping Indonesia’s place as an emerging power in the Asia Pacific region
and in the world.  Along with his role in sponsoring the Bogor Declaration, and emerged as one of the
most prominent leaders of APEC, he also wanted to be perceived as a symbol of bridging the North-
South gap52.
However, in reality, Soeharto seems to have pursued merely conciliatory policy towards developed
countries when he strove to make Bogor Meeting successful.  In other words, Indonesia’s policy toward
developed countries appeared to be formulated without considering its impact on Indonesia’s policy
toward developing countries.  How can it be possible when all the foreign policy issues were to be sanc-
tioned by President Soeharto?
This suggests that there were problems in decision making of foreign policy and in participants to it.
The next section will therefore discuss the participants of the foreign policy making or foreign policy
actors, their roles and their mutual relations.
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Domestic Actors in Foreign Policy Making
Actors in Indonesian foreign policy during the period of Soeharto’s higher foreign policy profile had
become more plural and differentiated.  There could be numerous possible classifications53.  However,
for this article, the author is using two types of categorizing.  The first type is based on the subjects or
the problems of foreign policy making: politics versus economy for instance.  The second one is based
on the character of external relationship.  There could be different approaches and actors, involved deal-
ing with: a) issues toward developing countries; or b) issues toward developed countries.
According to the first classification, NAM can be regarded –generally– as a “political” issue and
APEC an “economic” topic.  From the viewpoint of the second categorization, the NAM case can be
said as an issue that representing the relations toward developing countries while APEC can be regarded
as an issue that deals with developed countries.  Although not every member of APEC is a developed
country, the main concerns such as liberalization, free trade and globalization issues are more relevant to
be classified as the concern of policies toward developed countries.
It should be reemphasized here that my main argument in this article is that President Soeharto was
still regarded as the central figure in decision-making process for both cases.  This is what Suryadinata
firmly argues.  However, it seems that Suryadinata fails to elaborate the situations and problems on how
the interactions between the President and those other institutions or groups took place.
As to the decision-making actors in the NAM policy, it can be referred to the Suryadinata’s logic.  It
represented the decreased role of military to the President and subsequently President Soeharto delegat-
ed the large functions of policy and diplomacy to the MoFA.  The involvement of MoFA in the NAM
policy was prominent.  Most of the Indonesia’s NAM policy and diplomacy were formulated largely by
and within the MoFA.  President Soeharto appointed Mr.  Nana Sutresna as his special assistant for
NAM Affairs.  Mr.  Nana Sutresna –a career diplomat from MoFA– was installed a title of ambassador
at large.54 Ambassador Sutresna also chaired a special MoFA’s task unit that enjoyed direct access to
the President.55
The main duty of Ambassador Sutresna, and his special task force at the MoFA, was to support the
Chairman of NAM in implementing and following up all the decisions achieved at the Tenth NAM
Summit in Jakarta in 1992.56 Ambassador Sutresna was responsible to provide assistance and guidance
directly to President Soeharto in executing international leadership as the Chairman of NAM.  During
the three-year tenure of chairmanship (1992-1995), in his capacity as the Chairman of NAM, President
Soeharto was preoccupied with enduring duties in representing the voice of developing countries forum
he chaired.  And, it seemed, Soeharto greatly enjoyed this new role.57 Soeharto’s two most significant
activities as the Chairman of NAM were addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN)
in 199258 and meeting with US President Clinton in Tokyo on the fringe of G-7 Summit in July 1993.59
The discussion with Clinton was regarded as a very memorable to Soeharto and it subsequently affected
Soeharto’s future perception toward APEC.60
Contrast to the case of NAM, the existence of a team of technocrats and the pragmatic thought of
President Soeharto was distinguished in the APEC policy in 1994.61 A group of economic technocrats
who was advocating the liberal economy of Soeharto’s New Order government influenced the
President’s view for the new APEC policy.
The involvement of economic technocrats in NAM policies did exist, but only took place in relatively
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small portions.  An ad-hoc supervisory group consisted of seven former economic ministers who also
happened to be the technocrats including Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, Professor Ali Wardhana,
Professor Emil Salim and Professor Muhammad Sadli was established to advise President Soeharto as
the Chairman of NAM on debt problems.
At some occasions, the economists were given special task under the umbrella of cooperation among
developing countries, though not necessarily under the formal NAM’s auspices.  Professor Sadli for
instance was given an ad-hoc task to represent Indonesia at the Tokyo International Conference for
African Development (TICAD) in 1993 and 1997.  Nonetheless, the role of these senior economists on
the Indonesia’s NAM policies was relatively limited.  By and large, the office of Ambassador Nana
Sutresna and his MoFA staffs handled most of the main substantive Indonesia’s policies of NAM.62
Economic technocrats were, in general atmospheres, faced with nationalist or pro-protection groups.63
The latter were made up of the so-called group of “engineers” who believed that the cost of protection
was justified by acquiring technological capabilities and developing domestic industries.  This group
frequently opposed liberal market oriented policies.  Minister of Science and Technology B.  J.  Habibie
(1978-1998) was broadly known as one of informal leaders of this group.  There appeared an indication
of clash of interest in terms of substance between pro-reform (liberal-economists) versus pro-protection
groups in a number of economic policies.  However, interestingly, the clash between the two groups was
not the case in APEC policy making in 1994.
There were only limited evidences that the protectionists led by Minister Habibie directly challenged
Soeharto’s APEC liberalization policy.  The nationalists seem not to be very much interested in foreign
economic policy.  Their focus of attention was mainly on the domestic strategy, especially of the high-
tech industries, and more specifically of the industries of their interest, such as Habibie’s favorite air-
craft manufacturing.  Instead of from the pro-protectionists, resistance against the intervention of the
technocrats in APEC diplomatic process came from the MoFA.64
The conflict of perceptions between economic technocrats and regular bureaucrats, especially the offi-
cials in MoFA, originated from their differentiated views about Indonesia’s readiness to join a trade lib-
eralization scheme with developed countries.  This perception was naturally influenced by Indonesia’s
commitment in NAM, which still persisted a view that joining trade preference with “North” was a
threat to the interest of developing countries.  Officials of MoFA perceived that Indonesia still lagged
behind in terms of development stage and technological capabilities compared to developed countries,
while economic technocrats seemed to view APEC liberalization plan as an opportunity for Indonesia to
accelerate domestic economic liberalization program.65
Anticipating possible complain on this contradictory policy, and as an act of compromise, a number of
“development cooperation” programs were inserted into the Declaration.66 The official position of
Indonesia regarding the substance of the Bogor Declaration was that it had adequately covered the inter-
est of development cooperation in addition to the liberalization and facilitation programs.67
The rivalry between the MoFA and technocrats was more apparent in the level of policy-making
process.  It was triggered by the decision of President Soeharto in January 1994 to appoint a non-MoFA
senior official, Professor Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, as his special assistant for APEC.  Officially, there
were 2 tracks of APEC management when Indonesia assumed APEC chairmanship in 1994, that is,
Professor Bintoro’s track and the existing MoFA track.  The function of MoFA in APEC regular activi-
ties such as senior official and working group meetings remained.  However, the MoFA was put out of
hand in the drafting of liberalization plan that later was called the Bogor Declaration.68
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Unlike in the case of NAM, Soeharto personally showed his own intention of using a person from out-
side MoFA for advice on APEC.  Soeharto also admitted that the appointment of Professor Bintoro was
his strategy to avoid long and inefficient bureaucratic and diplomatic process.69 A resource person in
MoFA acknowledges that the existence of Professor Bintoro as Soeharto’s aide created some tensions
within the MoFA.70
Actually, the duties between Professor Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo and Ambassador Nana Sutresna were
more or the less identical, namely providing advice to Soeharto on diplomatic arrangements or prepara-
tions for NAM and APEC respectively.  A slight difference on the duties between Professor Bintoro and
Ambassador Sutresna was on the timing of event.  In the case of NAM, it was the implementation’s
stage, following the Summit, while in the case of APEC it was for the preparation leading to the
Summit.71
The rivalry simply occurred because Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, a career diplomat from MoFA, who
had played a decisive role in the founding of ASEAN and had been an active leader within the NAM,
was very influential in APEC policy-making until early 1994.72 It is easily seen from Minister Alatas’
on reason that career that he was anxious of joining a group like APEC on reason that it could be domi-
nated by Japan and the US.73 Highly praised for his diplomatic acumen and impeccable record as pro-
fessional diplomat, Minister Alatas was regarded to represent more cautious voices in APEC policy.74
This indicates that for the purpose of avoiding possible challenge from his foreign minister and other
bureaucrats who opposed the idea of free trade was the rationale behind Soeharto’s appointment of
Professor Bintoro as his special envoy in APEC diplomacy.75
The most crucial task of Professor Bintoro was to conduct “secret diplomacy” in introducing the draft
of the Bogor Declaration and proposed it to other APEC leaders,76 a duty that was commonly delegated
to the professional diplomat(s) from the MoFA.  Thus, the assignment of Professor Bintoro was made
largely by the personal preference of President Soeharto, and it was not based on the professional meri-
tocracy.
Idiosyncratic Sources of Soeharto’s Contradictory Attitude
Subsequent to the assessment on how Soeharto was brilliantly capable to manage the balance between
his goals for international leadership and simultaneously to gain a highest degree of policy-making sup-
port at home, it is also important to find out how was Soeharto’s own personal thought on the sub-
stances.  Basically, Soeharto’s standpoint on economy and foreign policy in mid 1990s remained nation-
alistic.  As can be observed from his autobiography77, his grand ideas generally relied on rhetoric, such
as social justice and people’s welfare.  Soeharto continuously refers to Article 33 of the Indonesian
Constitution that contains the normative provision that national economy shall be based on the “the peo-
ple’s welfare and justice”.78
Soeharto always wanted to impress that he strongly emphasized people’s basic needs, such as foods,
housing and health as his government’s main concern.  One thing that Soeharto was proud of lays on the
fact that Indonesia under his leadership was able to achieve self-sufficiency in food production.
Soeharto also denied that the orientation of Indonesia’s economy under his leadership concerned the
growth of macro-economy only as reflected in the value of national GNP.79 However, Soeharto provid-
ed a wide room for what he called pragmatism in exercising the economic policy.  In this regard, he
seems to tolerate the adoption of liberal economic concepts.  It could be assumed tentatively that
The Sources of Indonesian President Soeharto’s Contradicting Attitude in the APEC and NAM in the Mid 1990s 327
Soeharto’s liberal economic policy does not necessarily mean to represent his liberal economic ideolo-
gy.  He tends to regard economic liberalization as a means to achieve “the welfare of the people” rather
than as a genuine liberal economic objective.80
It is interesting to learn that Soeharto claimed his original intention of APEC policy in 1994 was
based on nationalism.  It is a kind of mild surprise to directly hear from him that his main intention in
APEC was to challenge the hegemony of the US and other Western countries.81 This indeed was contra-
dictory to the common analysis that the economic liberalization plan was strongly influenced by the
American ideas toward a global post-Cold War order.  This could indicate his inconsistency.82
Alternatively, Soeharto’s substantive standpoint radically changed after his resignation.83
Aside from Soeharto’s surprising personal view, the most important root of his foreign policy attitude
is that the unchallenged domestic authority had brought him more autonomy in foreign policy-making.84
Soeharto’s autonomy was determined by a number of inter-connected factors.  First, the stronger grip in
domestic politics that he held after more than 15 or 20 years in power.  This occurred mainly due to his
ability to manage the conflicting factions in order to sustain his political power at home.  Second,
Soeharto felt confident and had learnt a lot after being passive in foreign policy for the first two decades
of his presidency.85 Third, Soeharto seems to have been displeased with the military, the previously
most influential actor, at their mishandling of some crucial foreign policy issues, including the highly
sensitive East-Timor case.86 Fourth, Soeharto perceived that Indonesia was under a severe pressure
from the developed world for more deregulation and liberalization of national economy if it wanted to
attract more investment, which was one of the most important backbones of national economy.
Adam Schwarz (1994) put forward some interesting reasons behind the so-called “Soeharto’s newly-
discovered appetite” for a higher profile foreign policy since the late 1980s.  The first factor is that
Soeharto was motivated by desire to bolster his prestige at home and to defuse the nostalgia some
Indonesians have for the high profile of his predecessor President Soekarno (1945-1966).  The other fac-
tor was the need to counter the negative publicity, which Indonesia had attracted in recent years from the
US and other developed countries, especially regarding the issues of human rights.87
Conclusion
The most significant finding in this assessment is that mutually opposing and contradictory type of
actors or advisers did not necessarily produce contradictory foreign posture.  But Soeharto’s inexperi-
ence and his personal ambition to be an internationally distinguished figure were decisive.  This can be
explained when he used two different sources of domestic processes for similar purpose.  In NAM poli-
cy, he preferred to employ present diplomatic bureaucratic procedure while in APEC he felt needful to
cut off inefficient bureaucratic line and developed a short cut policy-making process instead.
Due to the autocratic regime, there had been only few independent policy makers appeared in
Indonesia during his administration (1966-1998).  At a later time when his attention to foreign policy
was in a high gear, there had been a large room available for Soeharto to maneuver comfortably within
the domestic win-set vis-à-vis external constraints.88 For his own purpose, he, by intention, utilized dif-
ferent source of advisers whom he thought were the most supportive in each respective subject (APEC
and NAM) in trailing this goal.  It is in this sense that the consistency and rationality in terms of foreign
policies’ substances were not Soeharto’s main concern.
Further details to gauge with any precision of just how much, and to what extent, President Soeharto
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shaped Indonesian APEC policy in 1994 particularly regarding the process of Bogor Declaration are
imperative.  This is worth especially in our attempt to obtain more accurate insight of Soeharto’s attitude
toward Indonesian foreign policy-making in 1990s.
Abbreviations:
AELM = APEC Economic Leaders Meeting
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations
APEC = Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Bappenas = Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning Agency)
CGI = Consultative Group on Indonesia
EAEC = East Asia Economic Caucus
EPG = The Eminent Persons Group (of APEC) 
G-7 = Group of Seven (US, Canada, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan)
GNP = Gross National Product
MoFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NAM = The Non-aligned Movement
GATT = General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
WTO = World Trade Organization
TICAD = Tokyo International Conference for African Development 
UN = United Nations
UNCTAD = United Nations’ Conferences on Trade and Development
US = United States (of America)
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